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Back in early March The New York Times carried a front-page story on the declining role of 
juries in the American legal process.  Although it remains a powerful symbol of civic 
involvement, the American jury seems endangered in much the same way as the family farm: it 
thrives in the imagination but has virtually disappeared from the modern landscape.  The Times 
reporter could scarcely conceal his alarm, blaming the loss on legislators, on appellate courts, 
and on "a legal culture that is moving away from trials as a method of resolving disputes."  Most 
readers were probably disturbed by this news.  Saturated with popular novels and courtroom TV 
dramas, most well-meaning Americans (including my own students at Brandeis) believe that 
most legal disputes in our country are resolved by juries.  They cannot comprehend the actual 
numbers: today only 4.3% of federal criminal charges result in jury verdicts; the number of civil 
cases resolved by juries is down to 1.5%.1 
The Times reporter invites us to believe that something is fundamentally wrong with the 
American system of justice.  But he never tries to show that juries are in fact capable of 
mastering the complex issues in criminal cases and civil lawsuits.  Rather his argument rests on 
the tacit presumption that jury activity measures the true health of our democracy.  A decline in 
jury activity, it follows, can comfort only the fascists and the autocratic elite.  Is it time, then, for 
all freedom-loving Americans to run for cover?  Should we consider emigration to more humane 
societies…like Canada?  Let's not be too hasty!  Our intrepid reporter has already moved on to 
other projects, so maybe we can postpone any travel plans until the follow-up article appears 
next year, as it surely will. 
In the meantime, let us apply his lament to a different purpose.  It is indeed striking that our 
legal system invests little importance in the precise task performed by juries: the determination 
of contested facts.  For those of us who use jurisprudential analogies to clarify rhetorical 
practices, we must admit that American law cares little for this method of warranting factual 
conclusions.  So-called questions of "fact" (the domain of juries) are overwhelmed by so-called 
questions of "law" (the domain of judges and appellate advocates).  We still need facts, but we 
don't waste time vetting them: we acquire them mainly by stipulation, or by presumption.  
Instead of applying warrants to facts, our legal process channels its creative energy into framing 
alternative warrants.  When we speak of the adversary system, we refer mainly to this second-
order process of questioning the very rules of decision-making.  Just as our legal culture has 
learned to live pretty much without juries, our broader public culture has learned to focus debate 
on second-order questions of method and process, beyond the surface issues of evidence and 
proof.  This shift is what we might expect in a society that is loosening the bonds of consensus: 
where disagreements are shifting to more fundamental levels, and where pluralism is penetrating 
deeper into the value structure. 
The idea that legal forms represent major currents in the broader culture is nothing new, 
although the relevant analogies appear to shift over time.  As far as I can discover, the phrase 
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"adversary culture" was first used in 1965 by the American literary critic, Lionel Trilling.  
Introducing his volume of essays entitled Beyond Culture,2 Trilling worried about the influence 
of modern literary studies on everyday cultural practices.  What will happen, he asked, to all the 
great works of modern literature--with their powerful message of rebellion and transgression--as 
they enter the standard curriculum at Columbia University, and from there (presumably) get 
released into the wider bourgeois atmosphere?  Mind you, these were not Trilling's exact words; 
but he was obviously troubled by the upper-middle class youth of the 1950's--content with their 
"gentlemen C's," and standing on the brink of comfortable professional careers.  What (if 
anything) will happen to these students, he asked, as they encounter the subversive ideas of the 
great European novelists: Kafka, Mann, Gide, and Dostoevsky?  What will happen to these 
students as they masticate and domesticate these modern ideas--and, more important, what will 
become of these ideas themselves, as they enter into everyday chatter around the corporate 
headquarters, around the law firm, and around the polo club?  Trilling predicted the slow dilution 
of this critical literary heritage, fostered no-less by universities: "the socialization of the anti-
social,…the aculturation of the anti-cultural, [and] the legitimation of the subversive.”3 
As the 1960's wore on, Trilling's phrase became a neo-conservative mantra, invoked to 
lament the trend toward conflict and rebellion that so traumatized the New York intellectuals 
associated with Trilling and the Partisan Review.  But Trilling's original concern was not to pin a 
negative label on the younger generation of rowdy dissenters.  His worry (formed before the full 
Kulturkampf of the 1960's) was how the very act of rebellion might be weakened if and when it 
entered the standard rhetoric of public discourse.  "Between the end of the first quarter of the 
century and the present time," he wrote in 1965, "there has grown up a populous group whose 
members take for granted the idea of the adversary culture."  Although people may disagree on 
practical political goals, the adversary culture "generates its own assumptions and 
preconceptions, and contrives its own sanctions to protect them.”4  Thus the days of rage and the 
domestic battles over Vietnam were entirely predictable cultural events.  Equally predictable, to 
push Trilling's theory, was the co-opting of countercultural slogans, lifestyles, and hairdos by the 
broader public.  For three decades television commercials have been fomenting personal 
rebellion, selling everything from luxury SUV's to distressed designer clothing. 
Adversarial argument comes in many forms, but let me distinguish three modes for purpose 
of analysis.  The first two have already been mentioned, and they roughly parallel the 
jurisprudential distinction between trial advocacy and appellate advocacy.  Disputes about 
factual evidence are the stuff of famous trials, from Perry Mason to Johnny Cochran: from 
fingerprints to DNA, from the deceitful heiress to that glove that just didn't fit.  The facts are in 
dispute, but the standards of measurement are fully stipulated.  Here is a stolid universe of two-
valued logic—the precondition for high drama, especially when the case gets submitted to that 
great black box called the jury.  In this realm of the excluded middle, even a hung jury generates 
a specific result. 
The second mode of adversarial argument is not about evidence as such, but about the 
warrants for judging evidence.  Lawyers earn their salaries (more or less) by debating these 
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arcane standards of due process, judicial standing, and doctrinal exceptions.  Since the 1960's 
(perhaps initially to torment Lionel Trilling), academic disciplines have heartily embraced this 
second-order mode of discourse.  Kuhnian paradigms reframed the classic debates from the 
history of science.  Erving Goffman's theories of framing deconstructed the tacit conventions of 
daily behavior.  The francophile theorists of deconstruction decentered the traditional arguments 
of dead philosophers; and the procession of radical turns keeps on gyrating through our own 
topsy-turvey times.  Most of us came to intellectual maturity during this period, and at least some 
of us have trained our critical faculties on utterly helpless targets of such revolutionary shape-
changing. 
In this wide-ranging domain the principle of excluded middle gets pushed aside.  The 
reductionist battle over facts is replaced by constructivist flights of argumentation.  The raw 
empirical vision is exchanged for a special transcendental process that I have described 
elsewhere as resting on arguments from ignorance—on skillful manipulations of presumptions 
and proof burdens.5  At this level, mere evidence is never enough to resolve adversarial conflict.  
Here is the true model for our contemporary adversary culture, now widely dispersed from 
remote academic circles to feed the revolutionary fervor of popular culture.  As Lionel Trilling 
might ask, what will happen to our daily lives when hot new dot.com enterprises deconstruct the 
old economy, and when some bold new commercial fragrance challenges the prevailing olfactory 
paradigm? 
These distinctive second-order arguments thrive especially in the ecological niches opened 
up by modern institutional structures.  Consider, for example, the discourse strategies found in 
complex organizations.  Perhaps most of us imagine organizational life as we find it in our 
respective universities--known in the sociological literature as "organized anarchies."  More 
typical of contemporary organizations, for most North Americans, are business corporations, 
public bureaucracies, and voluntary associations.  The old Weberian theory of bureaucracy 
treated these structures as the modern prototype of rational action, where formal goals and 
strategic action mimic the tight logical connection of ends and means.  A popular rhetoric of 
organizational rationality nurtured these large enterprises throughout the past century, including 
the recent frenzy of corporate maneuvers known variously as restructuring, reengineering, and 
reinventing.  Even universities came to embrace rational planning models: driving professors to 
spend years of committee time writing mission statements, lists of high-minded goals and 
objectives, and sweeping strategies supposedly derived from those guiding aims--all of it a 
utopian fancy that quickly turned into ritual and charade. 
You may recognize this utopian promise of rational collective behavior as an institutional 
analogue to formal logic.  The rational organization and the rational syllogism share a common 
ideal, in that both identify authority with a bloodless rigidity, rising beyond the frailties of 
practical judgment.  Tied inexorably to this rhetorical model, administrative authority rests 
insecurely on an Aristotelian ideal of demonstration.  In practice, large organizations face a 
whole range of external and internal challenges that keep them from ever approaching such 
fanciful expectations: challenges that are fully described in the sociological literature under the 
headings of uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity of collective action.   
                                                 
5 See my Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
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An especially useful work in this genre is Swedish sociologist Nils Brunsson's analysis of 
organizational hypocrisy,6 which is his inspired term for the skillful simulation of rationality--
that institutional pageant of symbol and ceremony, otherwise called "business as usual."  As 
Brunsson shows, most organizations learn to avoid being judged under purely logical standards 
of legitimacy.  They prefer to be judged, not by their actions, but by their internal procedures and 
ideologies, which place them on a simulated pathway to perfection.  In universities, for example, 
strategic plans are always much too vague to determine concrete policies, but they foster the 
useful public image of universities as goal-centered, entrepreneurial, and worthy of philanthropic 
support.  Three cheers for organizational hypocrisy! 
It strikes me that organizational structures, in their compromised aspirations to authority and 
legitimacy, have nurtured our adversary culture--especially as our lives are increasingly 
governed by institutional decisions.  A common mode of rhetorical opposition emerges within 
and around organizations, given the inevitable gap between ends and means, between the formal 
ideal on which institutional authority rests and the practical compromises that enter into 
implementation at every turn.  One dominant theme of popular discourse, cultivated within 
organizational settings, is suspicion of hierarchy, and suspicion of the subtle power to translate 
static goals into living procedures.  In earlier times--perhaps even in Weber's Germany--there 
may have been sufficient deference to elite judgment to buttress the rational image of corporate 
action.  But today absolutely everyone knows how to attack "big business" and "big 
government."  Above all, critics know to attack organizational decisions by emphasizing the gap 
between ends and means.  Today every administrator expects to hear complaints that he or she 
failed to follow procedures; but the defense is always tricky, and it risks further charges of 
injustice. 
   Followers of the Frankfurt School will recognize this sociological application of 
rhetorical concepts.  Standing on the shoulders of Max Weber, practically anyone can mount a 
fundamental critique of practically any manifestation of collective action.  That, alas, is the 
problem.  Unless we are still waiting for the fundamental revolution to take place, most of us 
understand that we live in a complex world, filled with uncertainties and ambiguities, and 
populated by large collective bodies.  We require no reminders from Dostoevsky or Marx or 
Kafka to guide our adversarial ventures. 
We practice the familiar rituals of dissent with simple ease; but it is not nearly so simple to 
hold our critique within practical limits.  In response to the daily slights of bureaucratic society, 
we need also to practice measured opposition and a constructive ability to move on.  But 
organizations seem to lack internal means for restoring this balance, as the rituals of opposition 
gather rhetorical strength.  The challenge is not to silence opposition within organizations, but to 
make bureaucratic authority more reflective and responsive.  Strategic hypocrisy is a step in the 
right direction, when it creates room for flexibility and change.  But organizations also need to 
strengthen recursive modes of discourse, to keep the adversarial challenge from destroying 
institutional unity. 
In addition to organizational settings, second-order adversarial arguments are found on the 
rhetorical battlefields of modern risk analysis.  Issues of personal health and safety always rank 
high on the scale of public concern, and everywhere we look we uncover ominous threats to a 
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long and happy life.  We are now accustomed to news stories about the ravages of underinflated 
Firestone tires, about airbags that kill undersized adults and children, and of course about the 
potential human consequences of mad cow disease.  Highly speculative threats are widely 
discussed in the press: reproductive harms from genetically altered foods, brain cancer from 
cellphones, leukemia from power lines and contaminated drinking water.  Even before these 
contemporary threats caught our attention, people were generally alert to issues of health and 
safety.  The rise of statistical thinking in the nineteenth century accompanied the science of 
public health, with its evidence-based approach to controlling the incidence of disease.  Danger 
started to come under human control, as empirical study revealed the human and natural sources 
of risk, and pointed toward rational methods for controlling it. 
In an adversary culture, human responses to risk take on entirely new dimensions, driven by 
the sheer quantity of risk factors we may uncover.  Since WWII, as petrochemicals transformed 
industrial production, as transportation narrowed distances between previously isolated 
communities, and as new information technologies expanded our knowledge base, our 
relationship to risk has grown far more complex and indeterminate.  Is the troubling incidence of 
childhood asthma caused by genetics, or by urban pollution?  Is the prevalence of lower back 
pain due to ergonomically deficient workstations, or to our fondness for recreational sports?  Do 
guns kill people, or do people kill people?  Professional risk assessors armed with statistical tools 
and ceremonial trust in empirical testing are invited to address these unanswerable questions.  
Their budgets may be huge, but their answers are slow in coming; and we are all impatient for 
answers. 
Debates over risk management have now reached the rhetorical level of appellate arguments, 
where experts champion competing frameworks for defining risk, and the general public chooses 
up sides.  It might be different if all we cared about was a single threat from a known and 
controllable source, for which empirical research could find an acceptable remedy.  For decades 
we hoped to control flu epidemics, and eventually medical research found an effective vaccine 
that could be mass produced.  In the 1970's, however, during the phantom swine flu epidemic we 
learned that flu vaccine, tragically, could itself become the source of crippling injury and death 
in a small percentage of cases.  How do we compare the speculative risk of a major pandemic 
against the statistically assured risk to a random group (less than 1%) of the innocent public?  
This damned-if-you-do-or-don't condition has set the tone for risk management debates over the 
past quarter century.  It has generated conflicting research frameworks, aggressive political 
strategies, and a chequered rhetorical landscape.  
Statistical thinking came of age during the 19th century, in large part, for the strategic 
purpose of controlling health and safety risks.  Statistics expanded the reach of empirical inquiry, 
using new forms of evidence to override conventional beliefs.  It postulated vast new realms of 
uncertainty, but offered practical tools for taming that uncertainty with standards modeled on 
sensory observation.  Today, however, we must contend with a far greater number of potential 
risks--including risks of offsetting action and inaction--as well as reciprocal risks that lead to 
zero-sum battles between interest groups.  Statistical methods generate multiple and conflicting 
hypotheses, as we know from trying to sort through the debate on global warming.  Techniques 
like cost-benefit analysis play an additional strategic role, attempting to sway the balance of 
power in the empirical courts of facts and evidence.  These economic gambits face stiff 
resistance in the higher tribunals of ethics and deep ecology, guided by prudential maxims like 
the burden-shifting “precautionary principle.”  Into this adversarial maelstrom flows a raging 
  
Shaping The Adversary Culture  6 
torrent of facts, providing raw energy for the interpretive battles taking place in the appellate 
jurisdictions of law and public opinion.  Type I error challenges Type II error; where new factual 
evidence only increases the intensity of the dispute.  More often than not, victory depends on 
who bears the burden of proof. 
So this is life in an adversary culture.  As lay advocates in this system of claims and 
counterclaims, we come forward as heroic amateurs to challenge the prevailing standards of 
expert judgment, and as discerning critics to challenge the tacit standards of social convention.  
By now everyone understands the strategic surge that comes from shifting mundane disputes to a 
higher tribunal, situated in some self-appointed jurisdiction.  “Our opponents may prevail on the 
facts, but let's see if they can survive this rhetorical change of venue.”  As Trilling would remind 
us, however, the fact that everyone seems prepared to make this second-order shift dilutes any 
lasting strategic advantage.  Instead of resolving disputes, these higher appeals may lead to 
endless jurisdictional battles, to the fragmentation of authority, and thus to inconclusive results 
that transform seemingly minor arguments into the clash of incommensurable systems. 
After all is said and done, what lies ahead for our adversary culture?  Is it a rhetorical 
encumbrance that we should try to cast off?  The term "adversary culture" began as a mildly 
condescending phrase about the popular contamination of high-cultural notions.  Soon it became 
a weapon in the culture wars of the 1960's, and it remains as a lament on the zealotry of the U.S. 
lawsuit industry.  In this article I have applied the concept to more fundamental rhetorical 
patterns: notably the tendency for everyday arguments to shift into second-order strategic 
conflicts.  Since the courts of public opinion lack a definitive appeals structure, these conflicts 
take on a frustrating, open-ended quality.  In terms of argumentation theory, most of these 
strategic sorties fly under the radar of discourse ethics, pragma-dialectics, speech-act theory, and 
other ideal-type models.  But assuming we can persuade argumentation theory to explore the 
ethnographic features of this cultural practice, what should be our larger goal?  Should we try to 
stamp out this expression of adversary culture?  To reform it?  Or perhaps to reshape it? 
My preference is to follow an incremental strategy of studying and shaping the current mode 
of adversary discourse.  I believe the strategic turn to second-order arguments is both real and 
irreversible, and in many ways highly desirable.  To summarize my earlier points, I believe the 
impetus for this rhetorical style comes from the many uncertainties of both facts and values that 
surround collective action in modern societies, and from the resulting plural possibilities for 
future action.  The past century saw the growth of complex organizational structures in our 
politics, in our economy, and in our society at large--structures designed to control complexity 
and to keep human beings focused and productive.  Around the edges of these structures, and 
within their interstices, the presumptive rules find endless possibilities for variation and 
adaptation.  We want these rules to be questioned in many specific ways, and by many different 
people, but not in such wholesale terms that would undermine the entire normative structure.   
The same cautious approval can be given to the emerging field of social risk assessment, 
where the adversary style works effectively to expand research hypotheses in promising ways.  
In particular, the environmental movement and controversies like the global warming debate 
have challenged more passive notions of risk assessment.  And yet I worry that some radical 
features of environmentalism could undermine collective efforts to control new forms of risk, by 
undercutting the entire concept of risk analysis. 
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In both fields of public debate, I believe that second-order arguments are here to stay.  I even 
think we should welcome these arguments, but we should also map their distinctive rhetorical 
properties and try to shape them to the specific contours of pluralistic communities.  This leaves 
me somewhere in the middle of the political-cultural spectrum.  By contrast, Trilling’s neo-
conservative followers took a more terrified view, seeing the shift to second-order argument as 
an uncontrollable “crisis of values,” which would slide inexorably into adversarial anarchy.  
They quickly renewed their faith in first-order factual argument, and indeed built that faith into a 
rhetorical fortress.  At the other extreme, the post-modernist intelligentsia celebrated the freedom 
of second-order argument, and many encouraged the flirtation with anarchy.  They seemed 
happy to sacrifice the closure of arguments, opening up a rhetorical stream that has never 
stopped flowing—and never will.  My search for a moderate path wants to avoid both of these 
extremes.  My position does not pretend to prove itself, nor does it rest on any transcendental 
axioms or demonstrations.  It expresses my personal hope that we can expand the areas of 
common ground between today's most vocal adversaries, using analysis and critique.  
What sort of analysis do I mean?  I hope that argumentation theory can focus more directly 
on the elusive reflexive dimensions of adversarial debate, most of which lie buried in the 
presumptions of indirect discourse.  To gain short-term strategic advantage, second-order 
arguments tend to suppress a whole substructure of presumptions.  In other words, these 
arguments mask the critical basis for supporting their own affirmative claims.  Reflexive critique 
may restore that critical structure in specific detail.  (My model presupposes a dialectical 
structure of communication, taking that concept in its Hegelian sense.7)  Whenever we challenge 
the very standards of evidence used by our opponents, we must anchor that challenge with some 
affirmative standard of our own, whether or not we choose to reveal it.  Before securing any 
long-term victory, it is not enough to perfect the strategy of rejecting our opponent’s critical 
venue.  Every such rejection carries its own presumptions, which can be revealed only be 
rejoining the specific context in which the dispute first arose. 
In most current adversarial discourse, with its emphasis on short-term victory, such reflexive 
moves are rare indeed.  It is up to the parties to identify sufficient long-term interests in recursive 
self-examination, through which one might still challenge the status quo without undercutting the 
entire reach of legitimacy.  In an appellate court, we look to a panel of judges, informed by the 
arguments of an equally skilled adversary, to supply this essential balance in the clash of 
strategic alternatives.  Outside the courtroom--in the broader jurisprudence of public discourse--
the adversary style runs the danger of overshooting its target, unless it reengages its opponent by 
returning the debate to its contextual origins. 
Take, for example, the hard-nosed economist, out to challenge defenders of the Kyoto 
Treaty, ready to put a high price tag on future compliance with energy-reduction targets, and 
warning that the American way of life is being put at risk.  In such confrontations, the rhetorical 
posture presupposes two incommensurable types of calculation: the concrete dollars-and-cents of 
resource economics as opposed to the extrapolations from fuzzy climate models.  The economist 
automatically “wins” if the dispute can be shifted to the jurisdiction of dollars-and-cents.  And 
yet this jurisdiction contains its own severe limits, including its own extrapolations from formal 
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models of technology and human behavior.  Both sides of the debate, in fact, need to address the 
implied limits of their respective efforts to set the criteria for public discourse.  The deep 
ecologists, similarly, need to fill in the details of how human society will thrive in that utopian 
jurisdiction where all economic calculation is banished.  At first blush their uncompromising 
norms may attract a wide group of followers; but most of us will probably turn back, once we see 
the operational details, to search for broader middle ground. 
What I am proposing sounds like unilateral disarmament in the midst of a rhetorical Cold 
War.  Indeed, for strategic reasons, we all want to protect our preferred standard from critical 
examination, while we conduct the rhetorical equivalent of nuclear war on our opponents.  We 
couch our implicit standards in universal terms like "justice" and "fairness," and then shift the 
burden of proof to our opponents to demonstrate that they are not unjust, and not unfair.  This 
strategy has been used to great effect in the field of constitutional law, where it inspired a 
revolution in the rules of criminal procedure, and where it has brought state bureaucracies under 
the power of aggressive judicial review.   In the appellate courts of public discourse, however, 
the standards of justice and fairness have been appropriated by just about every conceivable 
interest group.  In the environmental debate, the "environmental justice" movement borrows 
constitutional standards of equal protection; while the "wise use" movement, at the other end of 
the spectrum, claims exclusive dominion over fairness and due process.  Even though I have 
greater sympathies for the former group, I am uneasy in the rhetorical landscape created by both.  
In my view, it is not enough to preach transformation and then move to a rhetorical jurisdiction 
of your own choosing.  Indeed, the more revolutionary your critique, the greater your 
responsibility to explore the limits of your alternative standard. 
In the end, I am pleased to live in an adversary culture, but I hope all of us can learn to shape 
it in more productive ways.  Earlier in this article I suggested there were in fact three modes of 
adversarial argument.  Here, at last, is my triadic scheme for interpreting such conflicts.  First-
order battles occupy the traditional field of evidence-based argument, while second-order 
disputes display a more free-floating appeal to higher standards, which may or may not be shared 
by opponents.  The third level in this progression is a reflexive move--in some sense a step 
backwards.  Rather than outflanking one's opponent with jurisdictional shifts, this reflexive move 
reconnects both partners and narrows the distance between their critical perspectives.  Second-
order reasoning works by suppressing the specific context of opposition.  Bringing that 
opposition back to its contextual source rejoins the adversaries on common ground, while 
extending the horizons of both parties.  Evidence and facts may once again come into play, and 
indeed the range of data is likely to expand. 
So I close with this contrived scene of hermeneutic peace and harmony.  Perhaps the jury is 
still out on whether these reflexive moments truly exist, let alone whether we can institutionalize 
them.  I appear to have brought thematic closure to this article, but it remains only a strategic 
response to the sometimes bitter trials of an adversary culture.  Much work needs to be done to 
reshape this strategic environment—to preserve it in some respects, but to restrain it from 
becoming its own worst enemy. 
Argumentation theory can certainly help, but it will have to move beyond static models of 
ideal communications—variously conceived as ethical, pragmatic or dialogical analysis.  To 
breathe new life into the discipline, we must explore the strategic excesses of current discourse.  
In these very patterns of excess lie the tools for reshaping the adversary culture into something 
equally vibrant, but more likely to endure in a pluralistic world. 
